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Abstract
In this paper it is shown that it matters a lot for empirical research whether
policy is taken to be exogenously set or to be endogenous. In the model
investment depends on policy which depends on economically important
fundamentals and is, thus, endogenous. Conditioning on factor accumu-
lation in growth regressions that also include endogenous policy variables
may then be problematic. When policy is endogenous the measured ef-
fects of policy on growth will generally be biased. Based on the model and
OECD data, the signs of the biases for tax variables related to the tax
base and for redistribution are derived. Based on these signed biases the
paper discusses some empirical results that seem puzzling from a theoreti-
cal viewpoint. The paper argues that regressing growth on policy may still
yield important information if policy endogeneity is taken account of.
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1 Introduction
Most researchers acknowledge that empirical work on the effects of policy on eco-
nomic growth may be riddled by endogeneity problems. This paper concentrates
on that issue. It attributes any discrepancy of results to the fact that policy is
economically endogenous and that treating it as exogenous provides one with a
misleading picture of the empirical relationship between policy and growth.
For instance, many authors have investigated the effects of taxation on long-
run growth. Although employing similar theoretical frameworks1, their conclu-
sions differ widely. See, for example, King and Rebelo (1990), Lucas (1990),
Rebelo (1991), Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993), Pecorino (1993), or Stokey
and Rebelo (1995).
The link between (re-)distribution and growth has e.g. been analyzed by
Bertola (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), or
Perotti (1996). These studies often provide theoretical arguments that redis-
tribution of resources from the accumulated towards the non-accumulated factor
of production should be expected to affect growth negatively.
To test these theoretical predictions a large number of contributions has used
cross-country growth regressions2 This paper relates to that research. It first
provides a theoretical model that is based on a simplified version of Alesina and
Rodrik (1994). This model provides the theoretical ”lens” through which we
will look at some empirical findings. This is because it features some commonly
agreed upon properties. For instance, policy affects factor accumulation, which
in turn bears on output growth, and redistribution lowers long-run growth in
the model. Importantly, policy is derived from optimizing behaviour which takes
account of fundamental economic variables. Thus, policy is endogenous in the
1For instance, Koester and Kormendi (1989), Barro (1991), Barro (1997), Levine and Renelt
(1992), Easterly and Rebelo (1993), or Sala-i-Martin (1997) have empirically analyzed the effects
of fiscal policy on growth. Most of them find that tax rates or other, tax financed fiscal variables
have a negative, but - when controlling for initial income - statistically insignificant effect on
growth.
2In the paper I contemplate ’simple’ cross-country growth regressions which are meant to
reflect the procedure of relating time averages of or intial period data to each other. Of course,
’simple’ does not mean simplistic, since the availability of data may not allow for another or
a ’better’ method of analysis. Some authors have advocated the use of dynamic panel data
methods to pay explicit attention to the time series dimension. See e.g. Caselli, Esquivel, and
Lefort (1996). But the latter methods seem to have their own problems as e.g. argued by Barro
(1997), p. 37, Temple (1999), p. 132, and e.g. analyzed by Banerjee, Marcellino, and Osbat
(2000).
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paper.
It is generally agreed that productivity differences due to, for example, cul-
tural, institutional or technological heterogeneity across countries play a major
role in explanations of differences in growth rates. See, for example, Prescott
(1998). Therefore, the paper focuses on the effects of differences in productivity
and takes productivity as the economic fundamental. The paper derives the theo-
retical signs of covariances between policy, the growth rate and that fundamental
economic variable.
The signs of the covariances are then checked empirically. Based on the ap-
proach of Hall and Jones (1999) I calculate productivity data and use tax data
from the OECD and other well-known sources to find - at least for the OECD
countries - that the theoretical signs of the empirical covariances for the theoret-
ical predictions are borne out by the data.
I then conduct experiments with these data, which focus on estimation prob-
lems only.3 This allows me to use as much empirical information as possible. I
show how productivity bears on policy and growth. Based on the data I then
relate the theoretical predictions to common empirical set-ups. In line with most
studies it is assumed that productivity differences are usually unobservable. In
this case estimation would suffer from omitted variable bias. The theoretical
model is then transformed into a linear regression model. The derived signs of
the covariances allows one to sign the biases. These signs are confirmed when
calculating the biases using the paper’s data.
For more complex growth regressions in the spirit of Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil (1992) (MRW) it is found that signing the biases for the policy variables
must be done by the data at hand. The same holds true for simplified variants
of the set-ups used in the model uncertainty literature. See, for instance, Levine
and Renelt (1992) or Sala-i-Martin (1997).
It is shown that growth regressions would generally yield misleading results
if output growth is conditioned on variables relating to factor accumulation and
policy. This is because, according to the theory, policy bears on investment
which in turn affects output growth. Thus, including variables for policy and
factor accumulation would lead to misspecified models.
3In terms of methodology I will only focus on estimation issues in the empirical exercises that
follow. We will not address issues of statistical significance, which rely on estimation anyway.
For a justification see, for example, McCloskey (1985) and McCloskey and Ziliak (1996).
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Interestingly, the signs of the biases for the policy variables are the same for
all the different empirical models studied. Furthermore, they are equal to what
the simplest linear empirical formulation of the theory implies. In particular, the
empirical exercise would seem to confirm the following:
The estimates for the effects on growth of tax rate variables related to the
tax base are generally biased upwards and so overestimated. Thus, any reported
negative effect of taxes on growth is understated, if measured by these variables.4
Under the assumption of endogenous policy, the estimated coefficients of the
effect on growth of redistribution are generically biased downwards in the model.
That would render the hypothesis that redistribution is bad for growth untestable.
This is because the prediction of the theoretical model is that redistributive
transfers are bad for growth. However, in the model an increase in efficiency
makes an optimizing, redistributing government grant less transfers to the non-
accumulated factor of production. This last effect is ignored in growth regressions
when one assumes that public policy is exogenous.
For theoretical reasons many researchers expect a negative coefficient for the
effect of redistributive transfers on growth. However, many people find positive
coefficients.5 As any downward bias of the estimated coefficients may be as large
as minus infinity, a reported negative coefficient cannot corroborate the hypothe-
sis that redistribution is bad for growth. On the other hand, any downward bias is
perfectly consistent with many empirical findings and the alternative hypothesis
that redistribution is not bad for growth.
Recently, Rodrik (2005) has argued that we ”learn nothing from regressing
economic growth on policy”. In this paper a more positive stance is taken. The
analysis reveals that acknowledging that policy is endogenous may indeed provide
an avenue to gain some understanding of how policy and growth are associated
across countries. For this one may simply have to analyze potential bias prob-
lems in more depth. The present paper moves in that direction by presenting
experiments and empirical exercises to show how this may be accomplished.
4Effect is not meant to be causal. In this paper effect means that some underlying economic
fundamental influences policy which in turn bears on growth. Then the ”true” effect of policy
on growth is spurious really, but can only be picked up by linear operationalizations of the model
using data for policy variables. The paper then conducts thought experiments by interpreting
empirical results under the assumption that policy is exogenous or endogenous.
5For example, Sala-i-Martin (1996) finds this for the effect of social security contributions
on growth.
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The main insights to be drawn from the paper are the following. The dis-
entanglement of the interplay of economic fundamentals and policy one the one
hand and policy and growth on the other should provide an interesting area for
research. Conditioning on factor accumulation in growth regressions that also
include policy variables may be problematic. Furthermore, analyzing biases in
growth empirics should not be too difficult and would base some findings on a
sounder footing.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model
and derives the signs of the covariances. Section 3 presents empirical evidence
for the covariances. Section 4 analyzes the bias problem theoretically for simple
set-ups related to the literature. Section 7 presents empirical findings for the
biases. Section 8 provides concluding remarks.
2 Theory
Consider a private ownership economy that is populated by two types of price-
taking, infinitely lived individuals who are all equally patient. One group of
agents, the capitalists (k), owns wealth equally and does not work. The other
group of agents, the workers (W ), owns (raw) labour equally, but no capital.6
Population is stationary and each group of agents derives logarithmic utility from
the consumption of a homogeneous, malleable good.7
Aggregate output is produced according to
Yt = BK
α
t L
1−α
t , 0 < α < 1 (1)
6The assumption may be justified by various arguments, especially for the long run. See
e.g. Kaldor (1956), Pasinetti (1962), Schlicht (1975), Bourguignon (1981), or Bertola (1993).
7This assumption is invoked for two reasons. First, suppose that ex ante, under a veil of
ignorance (see, for instance, Harsanyi (1955)) people face a positive probability of becoming a
worker or a capital owner. This risk must be evaluated by agents who have to make decisions
for their and their offspring’s lifetime income, given that they end up in some class. For such a
scenario Sinn (2003), Robson (2001), Robson (1996) and Sinn and Weichenrieder (1993) have
shown that only those people do best (in a biological selection process) that evaluate such
risky choices by logarithmic utility functions. Thus, the model concentrates on ”surviving”
individuals in a world with risk and uses their (”fittest”) preferences in a world with certainty.
This also justifies why agents may have the same rate of time preference. The second reason is
empirical. Recent evidence indicates that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is in fact
close to one. See, for example, Beaudry and van Wincoop (1996). Thus, these two arguments
may justify a set-up with logarithmic instantaneous utility.
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where Yt denotes aggregate output, Kt is the real capital stock, and Lt is (un-
skilled) labour. Capital is broadly defined and includes human capital.8 Labour is
inelastically supplied and normalized so that the total labour endowment equals
unity, Lt = 1. The model abstracts from the depreciation of capital so that
output and factor returns are really defined in net terms.
The index B reflects multifactor productivity. Following Barro (1990) we
assume that the latter depends on public inputs in production, Gt.
9 In particular,
productivity is taken to depend on public inputs per worker as follows
B = A
(
Gt
Lt
)δ
, 0 < δ < 1. (2)
Thus, more public resources per worker channelled into production raise aggre-
gate productivity and create a positive externality in production. For a detailed
discussion of such external effects see Barro (1990) or Barro and Sala–i–Martin
(1995), chpt. 4.4. In turn, the index A is constant and represents the economy’s
state of technology which depends on cultural, institutional and technological
development and captures long-run exogenous factors that play a role in the
production process.
The public inputs in production are financed by a wealth tax. Following
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) we use a wealth tax scheme as a metaphor to represent
a broad class of redistributive tax arrangements, which distort the investors’
incentive to accumulate. In particular, we assume that the government taxes the
accumulable factor of production at the constant rate τ , redistributes a constant
share λ of its tax revenues to the (unskilled) workers10 and runs a balanced
budget: τKt = Gt + λτKt. The LHS depicts the tax revenues and the RHS
public expenditures. The workers receive λτKt as transfers and Gt is spent on
public inputs to production. Thus, λ will denote the extent of (unproductive)
redistribution from the accumulated factor of production (capital) to the non-
8This eliminates a separate treatment of how human capital is accumulated. By assumption
the economies are perfectly competitive and the return on human capital services equals that
of physical capital services.
9Gt is a flow by assuming that the government purchases a portion of the private output and
then uses it to provide free public services to private producers. See Barro and Sala–i–Martin
(1995), p. 152.
10Alesina and Rodrik (1994) show that the optimal policies are constant over time and, thus,
time-consistent. For convenience constancy of policy is assumed from the beginning in this
paper.
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accumulated factor of production (unskilled labour) in this paper.11
There are many identical, profit-maximizing firms which operate in a perfectly
competitive environment. They are owned by the capital owners who rent capital
to and demand shares of the firms. The shares are collateralized one-to-one by
capital. The markets for assets and capital are assumed to clear at each point in
time. The firms take B as given and rent capital and labour in spot markets in
each period. The price of output yt serves as nume´raire and is set equal to one.
Profit maximization entails that firms pay each factor of production its marginal
product,
rt = αBK
α−1
t and wt = (1− α)BKαt (3)
where we have used the normalization Lt = 1, and denote the rental rate for
capital by rt and the wage rate by wt. Thus, the returns to each factor are
decreasing for each firm at a given level of productivity. Below we will see that
more public inputs in production have a positive, counteracting bearing on the
marginal products through their positive externality effect.
The (unskilled) workers derive utility from consuming their entire income.
They do not invest and are not taxed. Their intertemporal welfare is given by∫ ∞
0
lnCWt e
−ρtdt where CWt = wt + λτKt. (4)
The capitalists choose how much to consume or invest, and they have perfect
foresight about the prices and tax rates, which they take as given. They maximize
their intertemporal utility according to
max
Ckt
∫ ∞
0
lnCkt e
−ρtdt (5)
s.t. K˙t = (rt − τ)Kt − Ckt (6)
K(0) = K0, K(∞) = free, (7)
11The model would have the same qualitative features if redistribution was instead defined
as, for example, tax rates higher than those which are optimal for growth, or after-tax incomes
of workers relative to that of the capital owners (under some preferred policy) relative to that
ratio under a growth maximizing policy. See, for example, Rehme (2006b) and Rehme (2006a).
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where equation (6) is the capitalists’ dynamic budget constraint which depends
on their after-tax income (rt − τ)Kt. In appendix A it is shown that their con-
sumption optimally grows at
γ ≡ C˙
k
t
Ckt
= (rt − τ)− ρ (8)
which is increasing in the after-tax return on capital.
2.1 Equilibrium
In equilibrium the spillovers resulting from public inputs in production influ-
ence the factor rewards. As Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1995),
chpt. 4.4, we will concentrate on situations where there is endogenous growth.12
To this end assume δ = 1− α so that B = A (G
L
)1−α
. Since G = (1− λ)τK the
factor rewards in (3) then become
r = αA[(1− λ)τ ]1−α (9)
wt ≡ η(τ, λ)Kt = (1− α)A[(1− λ)τ ]1−αKt. (10)
Thus, the productive role of government services makes policy have a bearing
on the marginal products. The return on capital is constant over time while the
wages grow with the capital stock. Notice that more redistribution lowers r and
η, while higher taxes raise them.
Given the constancy of the return to capital, rt = r, it is not hard to verify
that γ =
C˙kt
Ckt
= K˙t
Kt
= (r − τ) − ρ in equilibrium. (See appendix A.) In fact,
all relevant variables grow at this rate. Thus, in steady state the economy is
characterized by balanced growth at the rate γ, which is first increasing and then
decreasing in τ for given λ. Thus, first the positive effect of public inputs for
the after-tax return on capital dominates and that raises growth. But eventually
the taxes necessary to finance public inputs put a brake on this and reduce the
after-tax return on capital, which lowers growth. Growth is maximized when
τ = [α(1− α)A] 1α ≡ τˆ and λ = 0. If taxes higher than τˆ are levied, then growth
is traded off against redistribution when λ > 0 and τˇ > τˆ .
12Thus, the setup builds on Frankel (1962) and Romer (1986) who provide a detailed discus-
sion of the spillover effects that may generate endogenous growth.
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Furthermore, r− τ = αA[(1−λ)τ ]1−α− τ so that for given policy an increase
in efficiency A raises growth.
2.2 Policy
To capture distributional conflicts we will for simplicity focus on governments
with opposing preferences.13 Integrating the agents’ welfare functions (5) and
(4) under the condition that the growth rate is constant in equilibrium yields
the intertemporal welfare of an entirely pro-capital, V r, resp. entirely pro-labour
government14, V l,
V r(Ckt ) =
ln(ρK0)
ρ
+
γ
ρ2
and V l(CWt ) =
ln [(η(τ, λ) + λτ)K0]
ρ
+
γ
ρ2
. (11)
The governments respect the right of private property15 and maximize the welfare
of their clientele under the condition λ ≥ 0. That restricts the governments in
that even an entirely pro-capital government does not tax the (unskilled) workers.
The optimal pro-labour policy is derived in appendix B and given by
If ρ ≥ [(1− α)A] 1α then:
τ = ρ, λ = 1− [(1− α)A]
1
α
ρ
. (12)
If ρ < [(1− α)A] 1α then:
τ [1− α(1− α)Aτ−α] = ρ(1− α), λ = 0 . (13)
Denote the optimal pro-labour tax rate by τˇ and notice that for a wide range
13It is possible to analyze political preferences by weighting the agents’ welfare by some
constant. Except for introducing a new parameter (see appendix B) that is hard to measure
the model’s features would not change with respect to the fundamentals considered of prime
importance for policy here.
14This assumption allows to place governments on the traditional ’left’ (pro-worker) - ’right’
(pro-capital) spectrum. The analysis may capture democratic and non-democratic political
regimes. As regards democratic regimes the assumption has the advantage of transcending the
more conventional Downsian approach of political decision making that relies on a median voter.
The Downsian approach can be criticized on various grounds. The present set-up avoids these
criticisms by assuming that political parties, once in power, adhere to their party platforms.
On Downsian approaches and justifications of why the present set-up is useful see, for instance,
Roemer (2001).
15Although the command optimum in the model would call for expropriation of capital even
for an entirely pro-capital government, it is ruled out as a policy option since it is not very
common in the real world.
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of parameter values there is no redistribution. In particular, if the agents are suffi-
ciently patient or the economy is very efficient, the owners of the non-accumulated
factor of production (workers) prefer to have higher growth instead of direct re-
distribution. This is because high growth may be better for their income stream
and so long-run welfare than direct (unproductive) transfers. In that way the
model distinguishes between redistributing and non-redistributing (pro-labour)
governments.
In contrast, the pro-capital government chooses τ = τˆ , does not redistribute,
grants the maximum after-tax return on capital, and acts growth maximizing in
this model.16
All optimal policies depend on A, α, and ρ. In that sense policy is endogenous.
The rate of time preference will not be considered any further because it is con-
sidered a variable, which is very hard to measure. Furthermore, most researchers
find that there is not much variability in the capital share α over time and across
countries. See, for example, Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1995), p. 380; Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil (1992), p. 341; Sachs (1979), Table 3, or more recently Gollin
(2002). For that reason it is commonly ignored in growth regressions. However,
A is usually considered a very important variable for which I find the following:17
Table 1: Growth and Policy Effects
PC PLλ=0 PLλ≥0
τˆ γˆ τˇ γˇ τˇ λ γˇ
A + + + + 0 - +
PC - pro-capital, PL - pro-labour
Sign: (+) - positive, (−) - negative
16The optimal pro-capital and growth maximizing policies may not always coincide. But that
feature of the model is not essential as long as the optimal pro-capital policy is taken to lead
to higher growth than a policy that is optimal for the non-accumulated factor of production
(labour), and if the pro-capital policy has the properties derived from the model. Although
there is no necessity for these points to be true, see Rehme (2002a), the assumptions appear to
capture what is conventionally argued to be the case .
17The signs of these effects are derived in appendix C. In Rehme (1998), chpt. 1, I also
analyze the effects of changes in the capital share on policy and growth and find that they have
ambiguous effects on policy but generally raise growth under endogenous policy.
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Thus, an increase in efficiency raises growth, does not imply lower tax rates
but calls for lower redistribution under all policies considered. This is due to the
positive externality of public inputs. In the optimum higher efficiency calls for
more tax revenues for productive services channelled into production and calls
for less direct (unproductive) redistribution. That in turn raises the return on
capital and so growth.18 These are the theoretical predictions of the signs of
correlations and covariances one should expect in empirical research.
In the appendix it is also shown that the growth rate is convex in A under all
policies. Furthermore, the tax rates are also convex in A under the policies. For
the redistributing policy I find that λ is concave in A.
3 Empirical Evidence
In this section empirical checks are provided for the theoretical predictions in
Table 1. The empirical evidence should be viewed as suggestive only, because
reliable data on tax rates and redistribution are in general not easy to obtain
for a large set of countries.19 Therefore, I concentrate on the subset of OECD
countries for which data are more readily available.20
In terms of methodology I will only focus on estimation issues in the empir-
ical exercises that follow. We will not address issues of statistical significance,
which rely on estimation anyway. For a justification of such an approach see, for
example, McCloskey (1985) and McCloskey and Ziliak (1996).
3.1 The Data
Countries differ widely in the level of development, but reliable data capturing the
level of development are not easily available. In order to calculate the model’s
state of technology, A, I have proceeded as follows: Following Hall and Jones
18For example, Demetriades and Mamuneas (2000) provide empirical evidence for the positive
effect of public infrastructure on intertemporal output and how close various countries are to
the growth maximizing public investment rate.
19For a detailed description of the data and the methods used in this paper confer
http://www.tu-darmstadt.de/∼rehme/endopol/data04-07.htm. The sample is presented in Ta-
ble 4 on p. 42.
20An advantage of this, though, is that they form a homogeneous group so that one does not
need to control for regional disparities by means of dummy variables as has so often been done
in cross-country research.
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(1999) I have used a levels accounting framework based on a production function
approach. Under the assumptions made the aggregate production function is
given by Y = BKαL1−α = A
(
G
L
)1−α
KαL1−α = AG1−αKα. From this the level
of technology can be calculated as
A =
(
G
Y
)α−1(
K
Y
)−α
.
Using data from Barro and Lee (1994), Summers and Heston (1991) and the
OECD, I have calculated long-run averages for G/Y and K/Y for the period
1970-2000.21 Following Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) I have set the share of
broad capital α equal to 0.67. The resulting variable measuring multi-factor pro-
ductivity is called GA. The cross-country productivity differences are expressed
relative to the United States for which the value is set at unity.22 For checks
on the second derivatives of our variables of interest we also look at the squared
values of GA, called GA2.
Redistribution is measured following Milanovic (2000). Based on household
data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) redistribution is calculated from
Gini indices for the distribution of households’ factor income. These they are
compared to the Gini indices for the distribution of disposable income. The dif-
ference between them is then related to the Gini coefficient for factor incomes.23
21Notice that we have assumed that G is the flow of public inputs in production. Barro and
Lee (1994) provide data for G/Y by their variable INVPUB which measures the ratio of nominal
public domestic investment (fixed capital formation) to nominal GDP. For the period 1970-90
K/Y was calculated from Summers and Heston (1991), PWT (Mark 5.6), who provide data of
capital per worker (KAPW) and real GDP per worker. For the period 1990-2000 I have used
OECD data for government fixed capital formation and real GDP. Notice that according to the
model K/Y = A−1
(
K
G
)1−α
= τα−1/A which is constant, no matter whether capital is broadly
defined or not. This is what I assume to be the case here. Thus, even though capital may only
include physical capital in KAPW, it would still be a proxy for the models capital-output ratio.
See the online appendix for more details.
22An earlier version of the paper used the productivity data from Hall and Jones (1999).
The subsequent results are qualitatively and almost quantitatively the same when using their
data. Thus, their productivity data are indeed a good proxy for the model’s A as argued in
the earlier version.
23Factor income is defined as pre-transfer and pre-tax income, and includes wages in-
come from self-employment, income from ownership of physical and financial capital and
gifts. Factor income also includes public pensions. Gross income, in turn, equals factor
income plus social insurance transfers, which includes sick pay, disability pay, social retire-
ment benefits, child or family allowances, maternity pay, military or veterans benefits and
near-cash benefits. Gross income minus mandatory employee contributions minus income tax
equals disposable income. See the Luxembourg Income Study for the variable definitions at
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Milanovic provides data for 24, mostly OECD countries with a total of 79 ob-
servations. As there are not enough observation for the initial year 1970, I take
averages for these differences in Gini coefficients in terms of the Gini coefficient
for factor incomes over the sample period 1970-2000. The resulting variable is
called RRED and is taken to proxy the model’s λ. Thus, RRED = Gini
FI−GiniDI
GiniFI
where FI denotes factor income and DI represents disposable income.
To proxy for the tax rate τ I have used data from the OECD Revenue Statistics
1965-2001, OECD (2002). For these years the ratio of tax revenue to GDP is
provided for 30 countries. Here we focus on the initial tax rate in 1970 and call
that variable TAX70.
In order to link up with studies that have identified robust regressors in
cross-country work I have followed Sala-i-Martin (1997) and used male primary
school attainment in 1960, called MSCHOOL60, and life expectancy in 1960,
LIFEEXP60, as (robust) control variables. Both are taken from Table 10.1,
Barro and Sala–i–Martin (1995).
Finally, long-run growth rates for the period 1970-2000, called GR, and the
logarithm of initial income in 1970, LNY 70, were calculated using the Penn
World Table (Mark 6.1) provided by Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).
The following table provides information on some descriptive statistics for the
resulting sample of 29 countries.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum No. of Obs.
GA 0.713 0.166 0.44 1.01 29
GA2 0.535 0.240 0.20 1.02 29
GR 0.023 0.010 0.01 0.06 29
TAX70 0.290 0.066 0.16 0.39 23
RRED 0.337 0.096 0.16 0.51 21
LNY 70 9.243 0.452 7.93 9.92 27
MSCHOOL60 6.445 1.988 2.41 9.76 26
LIFEEXP60 68.760 4.460 54.20 73.40 25
For the variables of interest, τ , λ and A, this means that the average tax-
revenues-to-GDP ratio in 1970, TAX70, is about 30 percent with a standard
deviation of 7 percentage points. Redistribution RRED is such that government
intervention by means of taxes and transfers amounts to 34 percent of the pre-
tax inequality. Finally, in the sample the average country features a level of
http://www.lisproject.org/techdoc/summary.pdf.
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productivity, GA, that reaches roughly 71 percent of the level that pertains to
the United States of America.24
The next table presents the pairwise correlations between the variables.25
Table 3: Pairwise Correlations
GA GA2 GR TAX70 RRED LN70 MSCHOOL60
GA2 0.994
(29)
1
GR 0.108
(29)
0.097
(29)
1
TAX70 0.096
(23)
0.058
(23)
−0.122
(23)
1
RRED −0.412
(21)
−0.427
(21)
−0.060
(21)
0.609
(17)
1
LN70 0.133
(27)
0.140
(27)
−0.589
(27)
0.309
(23)
−0.245
(19)
1
MSCHOOL60 −0.206
(26)
−0.198
(26)
−0.341
(26)
0.296
(22)
0.178
(18)
0.514
(26)
1
LIFEEXP60 −0.004
(25)
0.017
(25)
−0.545
(25)
0.607
(21)
0.082
(18)
0.797
(25)
0.536
(25)
Number of observations in brackets.
For the variables of interest the theoretically derived signs for the correlations
are generally borne out by the data.26 For example, the correlation between
TAX70 and GA is positive (0.096) and that between RRED and GA is negative
(-0.412). Furthermore, the correlations show a positive (simple, uncontrolled)
relationship between taxes, TAX70, and redistribution, RRED. In addition, the
correlations between initial income and TAX70, RRED and GA all show the
expected signs.
Furthermore, the correlation between the tax rates, redistribution and growth,
24Thus, the data confirm findings that show that the United States is among the most
productive countries in the world. See e.g. Trefler (1995) and many others. In the sample
countries like France (0.82), Germany (0.75), Japan (0.52) or the United Kingdom (0.90) feature
lower values for multi-factor productivity - after controlling for public inputs in production. In
that sense the U.S. is an exception. Interestingly, Iceland features a value greater than unity,
suggesting that it is more productive than the U.S. Of course, values of A lower than unity
also indicate that public inputs in production and the other factor inputs contribute more
to explanations of output in these countries than in the U.S. That is because A can also be
taken as an indicator of our ”ignorance” about other, exogenous factors bearing on aggregate
production. Thus, the percentage of exogenous, ”unexplained” factors describing aggregate
output is larger in the U.S. and Iceland than, for example, in Germany or Japan.
25The associated pairwise covariances are reported in table 5 at the end of the paper, where
one also finds plots of TAX70, RRED and the growth rate against GA.
26Notice that the simple correlations between taxes as well as redistribution and growth is
negative. The latter would support the claim that policy is exogenous, as will be shown below.
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and the squared GAs, called GA2 support the model’s prediction that τ and γ
are convex, whereas λ is concave in A. See appendix E.
Therefore, the signs of the pairwise correlations seem to support the model’s
theoretical predictions.
3.2 Experiments
For the empirical checks in the previous section I have concentrated on pairwise
correlations as they use as much information from the data as possible. Thus, we
get correlations for a maximum of 29 countries and a minimum of 17 countries
for the correlation between tax rates and redistribution. This is due to missing
observations.
For estimation, which is the focus in the next sections, we would then only
have 17 observations when including tax rates and redistribution in a sample.
However, in order to continue to use the additional information that is contained
in the rest of the sample, I will now make the counterfactual assumption that the
covariance matrix is based on an equal number of observations for every entry in
the matrix. I, thus, assume for the thought experiments below that the pairwise
correlations correspond to the correlations of every element in a sample with
thirty observations with no missing values. With this assumption I now turn to
the implication of the model and the data for cross-country research. I will call
the subsequent experiments ”empirical exercises”.
4 Growth Empirics
According to the theory the empirical, long-run relationship between growth and
(endogenous) policy for a country i is of the form
γi = f(τi(Ai), λi(Ai), Ai) = h(Ai) (14)
where f(·) is a non-linear function of Ai which is assumed to be country-specific,
that is, independent and thus uncorrelated across countries.27 Notice that (14)
27Under the assumption of exogenous policy γi = g(τi, λi, Ai) where τi and λi are indepen-
dent of the other variables included in g(·). Notice that h(·) and g(·) may be observationally
equivalent when particular Ais lead to the same growth rate under either assumption. Thus,
assume that empirical and theoretical researchers agree that the Data Generating Mechanism
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represents an equilibrium relationship, because output grows at the same rate as
the capital stock. The growth rate of the latter, in turn, depends on policy. Thus,
the theoretical model implies that policy bears on factor accumulation, which, in
turn bears on output growth.
Equation (14) represents a possibly highly non-linear relationship between A
and γ. However, the model implies that this non-linearity can be separated out
by means of the variables for tax rates τ and redistribution λ. Thus, instead
of trying to find the appropriate empirical form of the non-linear association
between growth and productivity directly, one can use the information provided
by tax rates and redistribution in order to disentangle the direct and indirect
channels through which A non-linearly influences the growth rate.
A simple form to use this information in cross-country research is to take a
linear approximation of the growth rate γi in (14) for small positive changes in
Ai around a (sample) mean A, that is, dA ≡ Ai − A > 0 and small, as follows
d˜γi =
∂f
∂τi
∂τi
∂Ai
dAi +
∂f
∂λi
∂λi
∂Ai
dAi +
∂f
∂Ai
dAi
where d˜γi = γi − γ(A). Then d˜τi = ∂τi∂Ai dAi and d˜λi = ∂λi∂Ai dAi. Notice that
d˜τi ≥ 0 and d˜λi < 0 since ∂τi∂Ai ≥ 0 and ∂λi∂Ai < 0. We also have
∂f
∂τi
≤ 0, where
the inequality is strict if the government does not choose a growth maximizing
policy. Furthermore, ∂f
∂λi
≤ 0 and ∂f
∂Ai
> 0. These signs follow from the results
presented in table 1. Thus, we can express the approximation as
d˜γi =
∂f
∂τi
d˜τi +
∂f
∂λi
d˜λi +
∂f
∂Ai
dAi.
This looks very similar to a regression equation of a linear estimable model.
However, the differentials are taken around A and so around γ(A), τ(A) and λ(A).
But a regression passes through the point of means, that is, γ, τ and λ. These
means may not correspond to the variables as functions of the mean of A. To
reflect the qualitative information of the linear approximation of the theoreti-
cal model in a linear estimable model implies that we must use the theoretical
properties of the model to establish a qualitative congruence between the theo-
(DGP) is given by the joint probability distribution D(γ, τ, λ,A), which is expressed in terms
of steady state variables and, thus, ignores any time dependence. That reflects the procedure
to take time-averages of data which are considered of interest.
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retical and the estimable model. In appendix (D) it is shown that the resulting
regression for our model with endogenous policy would look like
γi = β
′
c + β
′
τ τi(Ai) + β
′
λ λi(Ai) + β
′
A Ai + ²
′
i (15)
where ²i is a country-specific disturbance term.
28 In the appendix it is also shown
that from theory we would then expect a non-positive sign for β′τ , a positive sign
for β′A and for β
′
λ. The latter property is due to the fact that policy is endogenous.
Redistribution lowers growth in the model, but governments optimally redistrib-
ute less when their economies are more efficient. Thus, the combined effect is
such that the association between growth and redistribution is predicted to be
positive in a cross-section.
The latter prediction is markedly different from what one obtains when one
assumes that policy is exogenous. In this case the model implies a non-linear
relation
γi = g(τi, λi, Ai) (16)
where τi, λi and Ai are all assumed to be statistically independent of each other.
29
Taking a linear approximation of (16) around the mean values of τi, λi and Ai
yields
dγi =
∂g
∂τi
dτi +
∂g
∂λi
dλi +
∂g
∂Ai
dAi.
The theoretical model implies ∂g
∂τi
≤ 0, ∂g
∂λi
< 0 and ∂g
∂Ai
> 0. If we consider small
positive changes in the exogenous variables we have dτi > 0, dλi > 0 and dAi > 0.
Thus, the linear approximation could be estimated by OLS according to
γi = β
′′
c + β
′′
τ τi + β
′′
λ λi + β
′′
A Ai + ²
′′
i .
We would then expect a non-positive sign for β′′τ and a negative sign for β
′′
λ and
a positive sign for β′′A. Thus, under exogenous policy tax rates and redistribution
28This disturbance term would in general be a complicated, non-linear function of some
underlying, normally distributed error term, which one would have to know for hypothesis
testing.
29Of course, that is rarely the case in reality. In fact, the paper’s data suggest that these
variables are all linked to some extent.
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should be negatively associated with long-run growth.
Hence, the question whether policy is endogenous or exogenous may lead to
a sign reversal of the (theoretically) ”expected” coefficients in a linear empirical
model.
5 Empirical Exercise I
We have seen that it may matter for a growth regression whether one assumes
policy is endogenous or exogenous. In order to get an empirical picture of the
model’s predictions I have used the paper’s pairwise covariances, now taken to
be based on 30 observations with no missing values, and run the regression
gr = β01 tax70 + β
0
2 rred+ β
0
3 ga+ ν
0,
where the lower case letters refer to our variables expressed in mean deviation
form.30 The signs of the estimated coefficients were31[
βˆ01 βˆ
0
2 βˆ
0
3
]
=
[
−0.0255 0.0123 0.0102
]
. (17)
Concentrating on these point estimates suggests that they seem to lend some
support to the model’s prediction that one may expect a positive coefficient for
the effect of redistributive transfers on growth under the assumption that policy
is endogenous. In view of the paper’s arguments this estimated coefficient may
support the hypothesis that policy is indeed endogenous.
6 Relation to standard research
An analysis of exogenous, once-and-for-all changes in Ai is similar in spirit to
models with exogenous technological change, which is commonly thought to be
unobservable.32 Thus, in line with most studies Ai is now taken to be unob-
30For example gr = GR−GR, where GR represents the arithmetic mean of GR.
31A ”ˆ” denotes the OLS estimate for the coefficient βji . Further properties of the estimated
coefficients, including inferential statistics, which are not the focus in this paper, are reported
and discussed in more detail in the online appendix. The superscript on the βs indicates which
model is being contemplated.
32The discussion about the Solow-Residual reflects these difficulties. See, for instance, Barro
and Sala–i–Martin (1995), chpt. 10.4.
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servable, implying that information on Ai would be contained in the disturbance
term and would not feature separately in the regressions.
In most cross-country growth research policy variables are included in regres-
sions as separate regressors, implying that they are assumed to be exogenous
explanatory variables. A standard justification for treating policy as exogenous
is a randomization argument. For example, Barro (1989) argues that in a large
sample public policies may be treated as randomly generated. That comes close
to saying that policies are exogenous. But in light of this paper’s analysis the
argument would not hold. Even if all countries had different governments with
different welfare functions so that policies looked randomly chosen, the model
predicts that all policies would be influenced by the same fundamental economic
variables included or not included in the regressions. The paper concentrates on
exactly that problem.
For that reason we will now concentrate on situations where one is aware of the
fact that policy is endogenous and depends on A, but A is treated as unobservable.
Furthermore, we will point out differences in interpreting estimated coefficients
when one assumes that policy is exogenous.
When A is taken as unobservable the second-best, but operationally viable
model for the regression in (15) would be
γi = βc + βτ τi(Ai) + βλ λi(Ai) + vi (18)
where vi = vi(Ai, ²i) is a country-specific disturbance term which depends posi-
tively on Ai and also on ²i. The latter is assumed to be uncorrelated with Ai as
well as with each of the regressors, and E(²i) = 0.
If that model is estimated by OLS, multicollinearity and the omission of a
relevant variable will be a problem. Thus, reported t−statistics do not report the
true significance levels and statistical inferences are not really possible. However,
here the focus is on estimation and the problem caused by assuming that policy
is exogenous.
In order to see what endogenous policy and biases due to the omission of Ai
imply, assume that for the estimation of (18) we use OLS and transform our data
to mean deviation form. This allows us to calculate expressions for the estimators
βˆj where j = τ, λ. Then the expected bias, called bj, which bears on βˆj obeys
βˆj = βj + bj where βj is the true estimator. Thus, βˆj − βj = bj is the expected
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bias. It is then pretty straightforward to show that the biases are given by[
bτ
bλ
]
=
[
aττ aτλ
aτλ aλλ
]−1 [
aτv
aλv
]
(19)
where aττ , aλλ denote the variances, and aτλ, aτv, aλv represent the covariances of
τ , λ and v.33
One easily establishes that the covariance matrix above is positive definite and
has a positive determinant denoted by D. Using Cramer’s Rule we can calculate
the expected biases as
bτ = D
−1 [aλλ aτv − aτλ aλv] > 0 and bλ = D−1 [−aτλ aτv + aττ aλv] < 0
since aλλ, aττ , aτλ, aτv > 0, and aλv < 0. This establishes the following: If (18)
is estimated, but (15) is the linear form of the ’true’ model (14), then we get
an upward bias, and thus an overestimation of the effect of taxes on growth. If
we assume that in a large sample countries are not all acting growth maximizing
then - according to the model - we should be on the downward sloping branch of
the inverted U-shaped relationship between taxes and growth. Thus, we would
expect βτ < 0, that is, a negative point estimate for the effect of taxes on growth,
under exogenous or endogenous policy. If we find a positive one, it would not
invalidate the theory as the true estimate may still be negative. Notice that the
model implies this may apply to all tax rate variables that are related to the tax
base.
In turn, we get a downward bias, and thus, an underestimation of the effect of
redistribution on growth. As the model lets us expect a negative point estimate,
βλ < 0, when assuming that policy is exogenous, the underestimation implies that
the hypothesis that redistribution is bad for growth is inherently untestable, when
assuming that policy is exogenous, although it is endogenous. This is because the
estimate can in principle be biased towards minus infinity. Thus, when we find
a negative point estimate this cannot be taken to corroborate the theory that
redistribution is bad for growth.34 In turn, under endogenous policy we expect
33Thus, e.g., aττ =
1
N
N∑
i
(τi − τ¯)2 and aτλ = 1
N
N∑
i
(τi − τ¯)(λi − λ¯) where bars over the
variables denote sample means.
34Further evidence that one may get a negative point estimate, when dropping GA from
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βλ > 0 so that a negative bias would not invalidate a ”true” positive effect, even
if the estimated coefficient was found to be negative.
Instead of pursuing the implications of the ’true’ model any further, we now
concentrate on the predicted covariances as implied by the model and relate to
standard procedures in the growth empirics literature.35
6.1 Relation to Barro-Regressions
A typical cross-country growth regression that analyzes the effect of policy on
output growth takes the form
γi = Pβ +Xδ + ζy0 + v
′(Ai, ²i). (20)
Here P is a row vector of policy variables, X a row vector of control variables and
y0 is the logarithm of initial income. This formulation goes back to e.g. Barro
(1991), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), Islam (1995), or Caselli, Esquivel, and
Lefort (1996). The inclusion of initial income is due to the hypothesis that con-
ditional on their steady states initially poorer countries have higher subsequent
growth. Often initial income is found to be a robust regressor, that is, it is found
to be statistically significant in many different model variations. See, for example,
Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997).
First notice that conditioning on variables capturing accumulation like invest-
ment or investment in terms of GDP in a regression that includes policy variables
will find that policy variables have no explanatory power, if policy is taken to
bear primarily on factor accumulation and factor accumulation determines output
growth.36
Next, suppose we wanted to test the predictions of the theoretical model using
the regression, is provided by the results of the coefficients for redistribution in model (23) in
comparison to those for model (17) below. The former is positive in this paper but a lot lower
and closer to zero than when including GA as a regressor.
35The theoretical model is supposed to capture essential features of the relationship between
fiscal policy and growth. Thus, based on the theory one may derive the signs of covariances with
A and the implications for possible biases for other fiscal variables like the ratio of redistributive
transfers to GDP or public investment to GDP. This has been done in Rehme (2002b).
36The same applies to growth accounting equations where output growth is regressed on
capital and labour growth, and other variables. See, for instance, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994).
If these other variables include policy variables like τ or λ which bear on accumulation, then
policy variables will be found to have no explanatory power in regressions for a cross-section.
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the Barro set-up. For simplicity, assume that the variables in X are uncorrelated
with the policy variables in P and with (the logarithm of) initial income y0. This
would be a rather desired property for estimation. Furthermore, for data in mean
deviation form we will look at the following two model variants as examples that
capture the essential features what is being done in the literature.
dγi = β
2
τ dτi + β
2
xi
dxi + β
2
y dy0 + v
′(Ai, ²i) (21)
dγi = β
3
τ dτi + β
3
λ dλi + β
3
y dy0 + v
′′(Ai, ²i) (22)
The first model in equation (21) represents in an abbreviated form an example
of what authors like Levine and Renelt (1992) or Sala-i-Martin (1997) do when
they study model uncertainty and assume that policy is exogenous. The typical
procedure is to identify robust regressors like initial income y0 and some other
control variables like x (e.g. life expectancy or an indicator of human capital) to
check whether adding variables of interest (here τ) are associated with growth in
a statistically significant way.
The second model in equation (22) draws on a simple version of regressions
that are derived from the Solow model. This approach has primarily been pop-
ularized by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) (MRW). Here the coefficients on τ
and λ measure the effect on the steady state growth rate, whereas the coefficient
on y0 measures (conditional) β−convergence, that is, how far countries are from
their long-run positions. The expectation is that βy is negative, that is, initially
poorer countries should exhibit higher subsequent growth.
One may then derive expressions for the expected biases for both of these
model variants, when allowing for endogenous policy. It turns out, however, that
one cannot unambiguously sign these biases from the theoretical model. Thus, a
theoretical model that incorporates many features found empirically allows one
to sign the biases only up to a certain point. For more complicated empirical
models, however, one has to check numerically the signs of biases using the data
at hand.
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7 Empirical Exercise II
In this section empirical evidence is provided that serves to show the direction
of the biases. For simplicity it is assumed that the covariances in Table 5 are all
based on the same number of observations. That allows one to ignore problems of
missing values that may have an impact on estimation. Against this assumption
I will now analyze various empirical models that are all linear.
Let us start with the simplest model, called model 1,
gr = β11 tax70 + β
1
2 rred+ ν
1
where ν is the country specific error term that depends on A. Again lower case
letters indicate that the variables are in mean deviation form. Running the
regression yields the following estimates[
βˆ11 βˆ
1
2
]
=
[
−0.0145 0.0008
]
. (23)
Comparing the estimated coefficients for model (17), with GA included, with
those of model (23) yields that
0 > βˆ11 > βˆ
0
1 and 0 < βˆ
1
2 < βˆ
0
2 .
Hence, the measured effect of taxes is more negative, and the measured effect
of redistribution is more positive in model (17) than in model (23) where GA is
missing as a regressor.
Many cross-country studies have found that fiscal policy variables do not affect
growth in a statistically significant way. This really means that the estimators
for, for instance, the coefficients β11 and β
1
2 , called βˆ
1
1 and βˆ
1
2 , are assuming values
that are statistically close to zero. From this it is then often concluded that the
”true” coefficients β11 and β
1
2 are likely to be zero. Clearly for this conclusion to
hold it is assumed that the estimated coefficients are unbiased.
However, biases due to the omission of Amay render such a conclusion invalid.
To see what the biases imply assume that the estimated coefficients are close to
zero. For simplicity assume that βˆ11 = 0 and βˆ
1
2 = 0.
This assumption captures the following thought experiment: Under the as-
sumption that policy is exogenous and the estimated coefficients for the effect
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of policy on growth are unbiased it is often found that they are statistically in-
significant. Thus, one cannot rule out the possibility that the ”true” coefficient
might be zero under that assumption. Now we argue that the estimated coef-
ficients are biased und that policy is endogenous. That entails that the ”true”
coefficients are related to the biases and, in general, are not equal to zero. In
order to see clearly what the biases imply in relation to any ”true” coefficient,
the estimated coefficient is taken to be zero. This would then be similar to the
finding that the estimated coefficient is statistically insignificant, when assuming
unbiasedness and exogenous policy, and when taking the ”true” coefficient to be
zero.37
Again denote the biases by bij = βˆ
i
j − βij, where i represents the model under
study and j indicates which regressor the coefficient pertains to.
When βˆ11 = 0 and βˆ
1
2 = 0 the biases are given by b
1
1 = −β11 and b12 = −β12 .
Thus, the ”true” coefficients are directly related to the biases and usually not
equal to zero. Using the covariances from Table 5 allows one to calculate the
biases. They are given by
[
b11
b12
]
=
[
0.00431 0.00324
0.00324 0.00922
]−1 [
0.00099
−0.00690
]
=
[
1.07671
−1.12674
]
(24)
The first thing to notice is that the biases for both variables are quite large.
For instance, there is a huge overestimation of the effect of taxes on growth
in this model. Given the positive bias and a point estimate that is taken to be
zero implies that the taxes really co-vary negatively with growth. Quantitatively
this means that an increase of one standard deviation in the ratio of tax revenues
to GDP (approx.
√
0.00431 = 0.066, that is, 6.6 percentage points) would lower
growth by roughly 1.08 ∗ 0.066
0.010
≈ 7 standard deviations of the growth rate (0.01),
that is, by approximately 0.07 so 7(!) percentage points under the assumption
that the estimated coefficient is zero.38 Thus, the presence of the bias seems to
37Thus, in the following thought exercise we assume that the ”true” coefficient is not equal
to zero, but related to the bias, under the assumption of endogenous policy.
38Here we use the concept of a β−coefficient by which β∗ = βˆyx
(
σx
σy
)
where βˆyx denotes the
OLS estimate in a regression of y on x, and σi denotes the standard deviations of i = x, y.
Then β∗ tells one how a 1 standard deviation change in x leads to a β∗ deviation change in y.
On this see, for example, Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998), p. 98.
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be a non-trivial problem for model 1.
For redistribution we find a negative bias. Thus, we can expect that redistribu-
tion really co-varies positively with growth under the maintained assumption that
the estimated coefficient is zero. The quantitative implication is that according to
model 1 a one-standard-deviation change in RRED (approx.
√
0.00922 ≈ 0.096)
would change growth by roughly −1.13 ∗ 0.096
0.010
≈ −10.1 standard deviations of
the growth rate (0.010), that is, it would really raise growth by 0.10 so 10(!)
percentage points under the maintained assumption.
Of course, the quantitative effects are only so strong because they hold under
the assumption that the estimated coefficients are (close to) zero. The magnitude
of the biases seems very high, however. But what is of main interest in this context
is that the direction of both biases confirms what was predicted theoretically.39
Next, we contemplate a simple model in the spirit of Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil (1992) by adding initial income as an additional regressor. The expectation
is that the biases will be reduced by adding more regressors. In particular, our
model 2 is given by
gr = β21 tax70 + β
2
2 rred+ β
2
3 lny70 + ν
2
With the covariances from Table 5 I have calculated the biases using MAT-
LAB. They are given by[
b21 b
2
2 b
2
3
]′
=
[
1.146 −1.173 −0.027
]′
(25)
Taking account of the biases implies that TAX70 is really expected to co-vary
negatively with growth and the association between redistribution RRED and
growth is positive. The quantitative effects are as follows.
A one-standard-deviation change in the tax rate (6.6 percentage points) re-
duces growth by 7.6 percentage points when one assumes that the estimated
coefficients are zero. This effect is not negligible in the long run. Similarly,
changing redistribution by one standard deviation (0.096) would raise growth by
11.2 percentage points, which is clearly a strong effect.
Comparing the models 1 and 2 yields that the addition of initial income as
39Recall it was found that the coefficients on τ should be biased upwards and that for λ
should be biased downwards.
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a further regressor reduces the biases and, therefore, mitigates their quantitative
impact on any measured effect of the two fiscal policy variables on economic
growth.
The last model is related to Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin
(1997). These studies identify robust regressors like male school attainment,
MSCHOOL60, initial income, LNY70, and life expectancy, LIFEEXP60, and
then add variables of interest to see if they are statistically significant. Their
robustness checks are an important step forward in identifying relevant determi-
nants of growth. These authors usually find that policy variables are non-robust
regressors that are associated with long-run growth in a statistically insignificant
way. To relate to these works we now contemplate model 3.
gr = β31 tax70 + β
3
2 rred+ β
3
3 lny70 + β
3
4 mschool60 + β
3
5 lifeexp60 + ν
3
The associated biases are now given by[
b31 b
3
2 b
3
3 b
3
4 b
3
5
]′
=
[
1.267 −1.066 0.070 −0.024 −0.005
]′
(26)
Again the biases are not small. For instance, a one-standard-deviation change
in TAX70 (6.6 percentage points) reduces growth by 8.4 percentage points. In
turn, changing redistribution, RRED, by one standard deviation (0.096) in-
creases growth by roughly 10.2 percentage points. Both of these effects hold
when one assumes that the estimated coefficients are zero.
Moving from model 2 to 3 one might expect that the bias problem is reduced
by adding more regressors. But, as the example shows, that is not necessarily
the case, because the bias for TAX70 is larger in model 3 than in model 2. This
suggests that a criterion for selecting empirical models on policy and growth is
to look for models that minimize the bias problem.
From all this one may conclude that the presence of biases appears to make
the estimated coefficients quite imprecise. This has, of course, implications for
any t-statistic so that arguments based on them may surely be problematic.
Furthermore, this paper’s data, when used for different model specifications,
provide suggestive evidence that the coefficients on tax rate variables that are
related to the tax base (the model’s τ) appear to be biased upwards. That means
that one should expect tax rate variables such as the ratio of tax revenue to
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GDP to co-vary negatively with growth. On the other hand, the data provide
suggestive evidence that redistributional variables might be biased downwards.
This means that the hypothesis that redistribution slows down growth may be
inherently untestable. This finding would call models into question that argue
that across countries redistribution is bad for long-run growth.
8 Conclusion
Within a common theoretical framework it is shown how policy affects investment
which in turn affects output growth. In the model optimizing governments take
account of fundamental economic variables relating to institutions, technology
and cultural features when making their decisions. This makes public policy
economically endogenous and has interesting effects on long-run growth. Several
findings of the paper are noteworthy.
First, growth regressions which study the effect of policy on growth should
not be conditioned on variables for factor accumulation. This is because policy
may work through investment so that including policy and investment variables
would yield misleading results.
Second, when policy is endogenous and an important economic fundamen-
tal like productivity is omitted in growth regressions, the estimated coefficients
on policy variables are generically biased. This has important implications for
arguments based on statistical significance.
Third, for different empirical models the signs of the biases are analyzed
theoretically and empirically. It is found that the coefficients on tax rate variables
related to the tax base are generally biased upwards and those for redistribution
are generally biased downwards.
For the latter this implies the following: If policy is economically endogenous,
the effect of redistributive transfer variables on growth are generally underes-
timated so that the hypothesis that redistribution is bad for growth may not
be testable. The downward bias is, however, perfectly consistent with empirical
findings in the literature which find a positive association between redistributive
transfers and growth. It may also represent corroboration of the hypothesis that
redistribution is not bad for growth.
The paper argues that more work is needed for the disentanglement of the
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interplay of long-run economic fundamentals and policy on the one hand, and
policy and growth on the other. Furthermore, paying more attention to the bias
problem in growth empirics may be worthwhile. This should not be too difficult
and would base some findings on a sounder footing. This paper has moved in
that direction and the analysis would imply that we may still learn ”something”
from ”regressing economic growth on policy”.
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A The capitalists’ optimum
The current value Hamiltonian for the problem (5) - (7) is given by
H = lnCkt + µt((rt − τ)Kt − Ckt ). (A1)
The necessary first order conditions for its maximization are given by (6), (7) and
1
Ckt
− µt = 0 (A2a)
µ˙t = µtρ− µt (rt − τ) (A2b)
lim
t→∞ Ktµte
−ρt = 0, (A2c)
where the positive co-state variable µt represents the instantaneous shadow price of
one more unit of investment at date t.
From (A2a) and (A2b) consumption grows at γ ≡ C˙kt
Ckt
= Rt − ρ where Rt ≡
(rt − τ). In equilibrium Rt is constant. Thus, Ct = C0 e(R−ρ)t where C0 remains to be
determined. Substituting for Ct in (6) implies K˙t = R Kt − C0 e(R−ρ)t which is a first
order, linear differential equation in Kt and solved as follows
K˙t −R Kt = −C0 eγt
e−Rt
(
K˙t −R Kt
)
= −e−Rt C0 eγt∫
e−Rt
(
K˙t −R Kt
)
dt = −
∫
C0 e
−ρtdt.
The last equation is an exact differential equation with integrating factor e−Rt. The
LHS is solved by Kt e−Rt + b0 and the RHS is solved by C0ρ e
−ρt + b1, where b0, b1 are
arbitrary constants. Thus, Kt = C0ρ e
(R−ρ)t+ b eRt where b = b1− b0. Substituting this
into the transversality condition implies
1
C0
lim
t→∞
(
C0
ρ
e(R−ρ)t + b eRt
)
e−Rt = lim
t→∞
(
1
ρ
e−ρt +
b
C0
)
= 0
which holds if the arbitrary constant b is set equal to zero. Then Kt = C0ρ e
γt ⇒ γk =
γ = R − ρ so that consumption and wealth grow at the same constant rate in the
optimum. Furthermore, the optimal level of consumption at each date is given by
Ct = ρKt.
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B Optimal Policies
The government solves: max
τ,λ
(1− β)V r + β V l s.t. λ ≥ 0 where β is the social weight
attached to the workers’ welfare. The FOCs are
β
ητ + λ
(η + λτ)ρ
+
γτ
ρ2
= 0 , λ
(
β
ηλ + τ
(η + λτ)ρ
+
γλ
ρ2
)
= 0.
Notice that γτ must be negative for the first equation to hold, so in the optimum τ > τˆ .
Concentrating on an interior solution for λ, simplifying, rearranging and division of the
resulting two equations by one another yields
ητ + λ
ηλ + τ
=
γτ
γλ
. (B1)
Then γλ = rλ and γτ = rτ−1 imply (ητ+λ)rλ = (ηλ+τ)(rτ−1) which upon multiplying
out becomes ητrλ+λrλ = rτηλ+ rττ −ηλ− τ. Notice rλητ = rτηλ and η = 1−αα r. Then
λrλ = rττ − 1−αα rλ − τ and so(
λ+
1− α
α
)
rλ = τrτ − τ ⇔
(
λ+
1− α
α
)
=
τrτ
rλ
− τ
rλ
.
Recall rτ = αE(1 − λ), rλ = αE(−τ) where E = (1 − α)A[(1 − λ)τ ]−α. Thus, τrτrλ =
− ταE(1−λ)αEτ = −(1− λ) and λ+ (1− λ) + 1−αα = − τrλ ⇔
rλ
α = −τ and so
τ =
[(1− α)A] 1α
1− λ . (B2)
Notice that for this τ we have E = 1. For the first order condition for τ we note
that η = (1 − α)A[(1 − λ)τ ]1−α = E[(1 − λ)τ ] = [(1 − α)A] 1α . Furthermore, ητ =
(1− α)(1− λ), rτ = α(1− λ). Eqn. (B2) implies λ = 1− [(1−α)A]
1
α
τ so that
η + λτ = [(1− α)A] 1α + τ
(
1− [(1− α)A]
1
α
τ
)
= τ.
Then the first order condition for τ becomes
β
ητ + λ
(η + λτ)
= −γτ
ρ
⇔ ητ + λ
τ
= − γτ
βρ
⇔ ητ + λ
γτ
= − τ
βρ
.
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But from above ητ+λγτ =
(1−α)(1−λ)+λ
α(1−λ)−1 = −1 so that τ = βρ. Thus,
τ = βρ and λ = 1− [(1− α)A]
1
α
βρ
. (B3)
which is equation (12) when β = 1. Recall that these equations hold for λ ≥ 0, thus
for βρ ≥ [(1− α)A] 1α .
Suppose λ = 0, then the first order condition becomes
ητ
η
= −rτ − 1
βρ
⇔ (1− α)E
τE
= −αE − 1
βρ
⇔ (1− α)βρ = τ − ατE
so that the solution with λ = 0 is given by
(1− α)βρ = τ [1− α(1− α)Aτ−α] (B4)
which holds only if βρ < [(1− α)A] 1α . For β = 1 this is equation (13) in the text.
If β = 0, then τ = τˆ . Thus, the pro-capital policy maximizes growth.
C Reactions under Endogenous Policy
Pro-Capital. γˆ = α τˆ1−α −ρ and τˆ = [α(1−α)A]
1
α . Clearly, dτˆdA > 0,
dγˆ
dA > 0,
d2τˆ
dA2
> 0
and d
2γˆ
dA2
> 0. Thus, the tax rate and growth are both (strictly) increasing and convex
in A under the pro-capital policy.
Redistributing, Pro-Labour. By equation (12) τˇ = ρ so that dτˇdA = 0. As
λ = 1− [(1−α)A]
1
α
ρ it follows that
dλ
dA < 0 and
d2λ
dA2
< 0. Thus, redistribution is (strictly)
decreasing and concave in A.
From equation (12) r = αA[(1 − λ)τ ]1−α = α1−α [(1− α)A]
1
α so that dγˇdA > 0 and
d2γˇ
dA2
> 0, that is, the growth rate is (strictly) increasing and convex in A under that
policy.
Non-Redistributing, Pro-Labour. For λ = 0 the optimal tax rate τˇ solves
equation (13), that is,
z =
τ
1− α − αAτ
1−α − ρ = 0.
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Let τ ′ ≡ dτˇdA , τ ′′ ≡ d
2τˇ
dA2
and let zij , where i, j = τ, A, denote the partial derivatives of z
with respect to τ and A. Then implicit differentiation yields zA + zτ · τ ′ = 0. We have
zτ =
1
1− α − (1− α)αAτ
−α and zA = −ατ1−α
The expression for zτ is positive for all τ > τˆ . As zA < 0 it follows that
τ ′ =
dτˇ
dA
= −zA
zτ
=
ατ1−α
1
1−α − (1− α)αAτ−α
> 0.
Differentiating zA + zτ · τ ′ = 0 again yields
zAA + 2 · zAτ · τ ′ + zττ · (τ ′)2 + zτ · τ ′′ = 0.
For our case and after simplification and rearrangement we have
−2(1− α)ατ−ατ ′ + (1− α)α2Aτ1−α(τ ′)2 + τ
′′
1− α − (1− α)αAτ
−α · τ ′′ = 0
Simplification then yields
τ ′′ =
d2τˇ
dA2
=
2(1− α)ατ−α · τ ′ − (1− α)α2Aτ−1−α · (τ ′)2
1
1−α − α(1− α)Aτ−α
. (C1)
The sign of τ ′′ depends on 2 − αAτ−1 · τ ′. Substituting for τ ′ from above yields that
τ ′′ is positive for the following reason:
2 > αAτ−1 · τ ′ = αAτ−1 ·
(
ατ1−α
1
1−α − α(1− α)Aτ−α
)
2 > 2α(1− α)Aτ−α − α2Aτ−α
because α(1 − α)Aτ−α < 1 with τˇ > τˆ . Hence, τˇ is (strictly) increasing and convex
under this policy.
For the growth rate one finds dγdA = rA + (rτ − 1) dτdA , that is,
ατ1−α − τ ′ + (1− α)αAτ−α · τ ′. (C2)
This is positive if
ατ1−α >
(
1− α(1− α)Aτ−α) [α(1− α)τ (τα − α(1− α)2A)−1]
τα − α2(1− α)2A > (1− α)τα − α2(1− α)2A
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which is equivalent to 1 > 1− α and true. Thus, dγˇdA > 0 if λ = 0 in (13).
Differentiating (C2) again yields
2α(1− α)Aτ−α · τ ′ − α2(1− α)Aτ−1−α · (τ ′)2 − τ ′′ + α(1− α)Aτ−α · τ ′′. (C3)
Let ∆ ≡ 2α(1 − α)Aτ−α · τ ′ − α2(1 − α)Aτ−1−α · (τ ′)2. Using (C1) the sign in (C3)
depends on
∆−
[
1− α(1− α)Aτ−α
1
1−α − α(1− α)Aτ−α
]
∆
which is positive because the expression in square brackets is less than one. Hence,
dγˇ
dA > 0 and
d2γˇ
dA2
> 0 so that the growth rate is (strictly) increasing and convex in A
under that policy.
D Expected Coefficients under Exogenous and
Endogenous Policy
In this appendix I show that, when policy is endogenous, the (theoretically) expected40,
so (theoretically) ’true’ regression coefficients may have opposite signs compared to the
(theoretically) expected ’true’ coefficients under the assumption of exogenous policy,
even though the models in question are observationally equivalent.
D.1 Exogenous Policy
Under the assumption that policy is exogenous we have
γ1i = g(τi, λi, Ai) (D1)
where τ, λ and A are treated as exogenous variables and i indexes country i. The model
implies
∂g
∂τi |τi,λi,Ai
≤ 0, ∂g
∂λi |τi,λi,Ai
< 0,
∂g
∂Ai |τi,λi,Ai
> 0. (D2)
40By ”expected” I do not mean a mathematical expectation. Instead, we look for the (sign)
prediction for any (unknown) coefficient in a linear empirical model when translating properties
of a (non-linear) theoretical model to an estimable (linear) regression model. On the distinction
of theoretical and empirical models see e.g. Spanos (1986), chp. 1.
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D.2 Endogenous Policy
When policy is taken to be endogenous we have
γ2i = f(τi(Ai), λi(Ai), Ai) = h(Ai) (D3)
where τ, λ and are now endogenous variables that depend on A and i again indexes
country i. That model implies dhdA > 0 (strictly so), but also
∂f
∂τi |τ(Ai),λ(Ai),Ai
≤ 0, ∂f
∂λi |τ(Ai),λ(Ai),Ai
< 0,
∂f
∂Ai |τ(Ai),λ(Ai),Ai
> 0. (D4)
and we have41
∂τi
∂Ai |Ai
> 0 and
∂λi
∂Ai |τ(Ai),Ai
< 0. (D5)
and
∂2τi
∂A2i |Ai
< 0 and
∂2λi
∂A2i |τ(Ai),Ai
< 0 (D6)
All these derivatives never change signs from positive to negative or vice versa in the
theoretical model. Furthermore, the latter property implies that τ(A) and λ(A) are
strictly concave in A.
D.3 Remark
Assume that for any observed (τ, λ,A) models (D1) and (D3) would look the same.
Thus, they are observationally equivalent. For observed values of τ, λ,A, we would
then have γ1 ≈ γ2.
D.4 Estimable Models
We shall consider statistical (estimable) linear models that use OLS in order to investi-
gate the theoretical non-linear relationships between γ and (τ, λ,A). Notice that OLS
implies that any regression line must pass through the point γ, τ , λ,A, that is, it passes
through the sample means of these variables.
41In the model the (optimal) tax rates depend on A, but not on λ, whereas redistribution λ
depends on A and the tax rate τ .
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D.4.1 Exogenous Policy
To convert model (D1) into a regression we take a linear approximation of the theoret-
ical model around the sample means. This yields
dγ1i =
∂g
∂τi |τ ,λ,A
dτi +
∂g
∂λi |τ ,λ,A
dλi +
∂g
∂Ai |τ ,λ,A
dAi. (D7)
where dγ1i = γ
1
i − γ1(τ , λ,A), dτi = τi − τ , dλi = λi − λ, and dAi = Ai − A. Notice
that due to the nonlinearity γ1(τ , λ,A) may not coincide with the sample mean of γ1,
denoted by γ1.
As the partial derivatives, evaluated at the sample means of the corresponding
variables, are constant, the systematic part of an OLS regression for data in mean
deviation form would look like
doγ1i = β
1
1 dτi + β
1
2 dλi + β
1
3 dAi + c
1. (D8)
where doγ1i ≡ γ1i − γ1 and c1 = γ1(τ , λ,A)− γ1, which is constant as it depends on the
sample means only. In a standard model c1 would then feature in the constant or the
error term of the regression. Equation (D8) represents the estimable model.
The (theoretical signs of the ) coefficients β1j , j = 1, 2, 3 of the estimable model
are not determined yet. To turn the estimable model into a model that captures
the predictions of the theoretical model it must be that the estimable model (D8)
reflects the sign predictions of the linearized theoretical model (D7). That is the case if
sgn(β11 dτi) = sgn(
∂g
∂τi |τ ,λ,A dτi), sgn(β
1
2 dλi) = sgn(
∂g
∂λi |τ ,λ,A dλi), and sgn(β
1
3 dAi) =
sgn( ∂g∂Ai |τ ,λ,A dAi). Thus, for the coefficients in a regression we would consequently
”expect”
β11 ≤ 0, β12 < 0 β13 > 0.
Thus, we ”expect” a non-positive coefficient for the effect of higher taxes τ , β11 ≤ 0,
and a negative coefficient of more redistribution λ, β12 < 0, but a positive one for the
effect of the fundamental variable A, β13 > 0, on growth.
D.4.2 Endogenous Policy
Under endogenous policy things are different. First, we again take a first order approx-
imation of (D3), but this time around A and - because of endogeneity - around γ(A).
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When only contemplating small positive changes in A around A, we get42
dγ2i =
∂f
∂τi |τ(A),λ(A),A
· ∂τi
∂Ai |A
· dAi + ∂f
∂λi |τ(A),λ(A),A
· ∂λi
∂Ai |A
· dAi + ∂f
∂Ai |τ(A),λ(A),A
· dAi.
where dγ2i = γi − γ(τ(A), λ(A), A) = γi − γ(A), and small dAi > 0 . From the theory
(see equation (D4)) we use the following definitions and know that
fτ ≡ ∂f
∂τi |τ(A),λ(A),A
≤ 0, fλ ≡ ∂f
∂λi |τ(A),λ(A),A
< 0, fA ≡ ∂f
∂Ai |τ(A),λ(A),A
> 0
which are constant around A.
For this approximation notice that
d˜τi =
∂τi
∂Ai |A
· dAi and d˜λi = ∂λi
∂Ai |τ(A),A
· dAi.
This follows from the definition of differentials. The latter are all defined around A.
Thus, we have the following:
dAi = Ai −A, d˜τi = τi − τ(A), d˜λi = λi − λ(A).
Furthermore, dγ2i = γi − γ(τ(A), λ(A), A) = γi − γ(A).
These properties allow us to reformulate the approximation as
dγ2i = fτ · d˜τi + fλ · d˜λi + fA · dAi (D9)
Now we know that fτ ≤ 0, fλ < 0 and fA > 0 and these derivatives do not change sign
from positive to negative or vice versa as they hold strictly so. Furthermore, d˜τi > 0
since dAi > 0 by assumption, and ∂τi∂Ai |A > 0 by equation (D5). Then d˜λi < 0 because
∂λi
∂Ai |τ(A),A < 0, again by equation (D5) and dAi > 0 by assumption. Thus,
dγ2i = fτ
(−,0)
· d˜τi
(+)
+ fλ
(−)
· d˜λi
(−)
+ fA
(+)
· dAi
(+)
(D10)
This equation looks deceptively similar to (the systematic part of) an ordinary OLS
equation. However, it is important to notice that under standard approximation
and calculation arguments an OLS formulation doγ2i is considered around the vari-
42The assumption of small changes Ai captures that we wish to be as precise as possible
when turning the non-linear model into a first order approximation.
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ables’ sample means, γ, τ , λ, and A, whereas the approximation in (D10) is around
γ(A), τ(A), λ(A), and A. These latter values will in general not correspond to the val-
ues of their arithmetic means. But from (D10) we get an estimable model for OLS of
the following form
doγ2i = β
2
1 · dτi + β22 · dλi + β23 · dAi + c2 (D11)
where do = γ2i − γ2 and c2 = (γ2i − γ2i (A)) which is constant.
Now the estimable model (D11) shares the qualitative features of the linearized
model (D10) if the following holds:43
First, as sgn(fA · dAi) = sgn(β23 · dAi) and fA > 0 we conclude to ”expect” a
positive sign for β23 .
Next, we ask under what circumstances we have44
sgn(β21 · dτi) = sgn( fτ
(−,0)
· d˜τi
(+)
).
Note that β21 is yet undetermined. Thus, the LHS depends on the sign of dτi, which
must be determined by theory in our case. This is because we assume that that the Data
Generating Mechanism (DGP) only depends on A when policy is endogenous. From
the theory we know that d˜τi > 0 which is evaluated around τ(A). Given the concavity
of τ(A) (see equation (D6)), we know by Jensen’s Inequality45 that τ(A) > τ , that is,
the sample mean τ is smaller than the tax rate τ generated by the sample mean of
Ai. Then dτi = τi − τi > d˜τi = τi − τ(A) > 0. But then the sign equality implies
β21 ≤ 0. Thus, we ”expect” a non-positive coefficient for the effect of taxes on growth
in a regression.
Finally, we should have
sgn(β22 · dλi) = sgn(fλ
(−)
· d˜λi
(−)
).
Again β22 is yet undetermined. The LHS depends on the sign of dλi. From the theory
we know that d˜λi < 0 which is evaluated around λ(A). Given the concavity of λ(A)
43Again we take the data to be in mean deviation form. Furthermore, we again note that the
estimable model has not restricted the signs of the β−coefficients from theory yet. This needs
to be determined by the arguments below.
44We use the following property of the sgn function: sgn(x · y) = sgn(x) · sgn(y).
45Jensen’s Inequality for concave functions (and the case of uncertainty): Let x be a random
variable. Let y = f(x), f ′ R 0, f ′′ < 0. Then f ′′ < 0, implies Ef(x) < f(E(x)). See, for
example, Hirshleifer and Riley (1992), p. 25.
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(see equation (D6)), we know by Jensen’s Inequality that λ(A) > λ, that is, the sample
mean λ is smaller than the redistribution λ generated by the sample mean of Ai. But
then dλi = λi − λi > d˜λi = λi − λ(A). Given we make the differentials small, but not
zero - as in any approximation - we have dλi > 0 whereas d˜λi < 0.46 But then the
sign equality implies that we ”expect” β22 > 0 from theory. Thus, we should ”expect”
a positive coefficient for the effect of redistribution on growth in a regression.
Hence, we would have a sign reversal for the (theoretically) expected ’true’ coef-
ficient of the effect of redistribution, i.e. β12 < 0 vs. β
2
2 > 0, under the assumption
that policy is endogenous and we interpret OLS results in comparison to what we
(theoretically) expect under the assumption of exogenous policy and the corresponding
interpretation of OLS results.
Summarizing, we would ”expect” for endogenous policy that
β12 ≤ 0, β22 > 0 β23 > 0.
Hence, the (theoretically) ”expected” ’true’ sign of a particular coefficient in a
linear empirical model may take on opposing values depending on whether policy is
endogenous or not.
E Empirical Check for the Second Derivative
Property
A simple check whether the data support the hypothesis that the policy variables and
the growth rate are convex or concave in GA is the following. Let x be the variable of
interest. Then a simple regression of the form
x = α+ β GA2 (E1)
contains the information on the second derivative. First, notice that dx = 2β GA
would correspond to the first derivative of x with respect to GA so that d2x = 2β
would represent the second derivative. The sign of the estimated OLS coefficient β
would then reveal the sign of that coefficient. The latter clearly depends on the sign of
the covariance between x and GA2. Hence, the covariances (correlations) presented in
the text support the paper’s predictions.
46Given that we take dAi to be small and positive, there always exists an Ai sufficiently close
to A such that λ(A) > λ(Ai) > λi because λ(A) is strictly decreasing in A, and we have the
strict inequality λ(A) > λi by Jensen’s Inequality.
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Table 4: The Sample
TAX70 RRED GA LNY 70 MSCHOOL60 LIFEEXP60 GR
Australia 0.225 0.28 0.614 9.600 9.01 70.7 0.018
Austria 0.346 n.a. 0.769 9.320 4.08 68.8 0.025
Belgium 0.345 0.49 0.849 9.400 7.62 69.7 0.023
Canada 0.308 0.25 0.846 9.560 7.93 71.1 0.021
Czech Republic n.a. 0.50 0.489 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.017
Denmark 0.392 0.41 0.758 9.670 9.14 72.2 0.017
Finland 0.319 0.37 0.619 9.330 7.60 68.5 0.025
France 0.341 0.29 0.816 9.410 4.21 70.4 0.020
Germany 0.323 0.33 0.747 9.420 7.83 69.4 0.021
Greece 0.224 n.a. 0.612 9.020 5.36 68.8 0.019
Hungary n.a. 0.42 0.492 8.590 7.13 68.4 0.022
Iceland 0.269 n.a. 1.009 9.290 5.86 n.a. 0.028
Ireland 0.288 0.32 0.833 8.890 6.30 69.7 0.043
Italy 0.261 0.27 0.905 9.320 4.96 69.4 0.022
Japan 0.200 n.a. 0.519 9.340 7.20 67.7 0.026
Korea n.a. n.a. 0.650 7.930 4.58 54.2 0.058
Luxembourg 0.249 0.34 0.615 9.620 n.a. n.a. 0.036
Mexico n.a. n.a. 0.811 8.610 2.69 57.3 0.016
Netherlands 0.358 0.30 0.771 9.490 5.63 73.3 0.020
New Zealand 0.268 n.a. 0.639 9.520 9.76 71.0 0.011
Norway 0.345 0.37 0.445 9.320 5.91 73.4 0.030
Poland n.a. 0.30 0.554 8.420 7.38 67.3 0.024
Portugal 0.194 n.a. 0.759 8.750 2.41 63.7 0.031
Slovak Republic n.a. 0.51 0.490 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.012
Spain 0.163 0.25 0.970 9.110 3.69 68.9 0.023
Sweden 0.387 0.43 0.708 9.600 7.70 73.2 0.016
Switzerland 0.225 0.16 0.497 9.920 7.28 71.3 0.009
United Kingdom 0.370 0.28 0.896 9.400 7.71 70.8 0.020
United States 0.277 0.20 1.000 9.710 8.59 69.8 0.023
Mean 0.290 0.34 0.713 9.243 6.45 68.8 0.023
SD 0.066 0.10 0.166 0.45 1.98 4.46 0.010
The growth rates for the Czech and Slovak Republic were calculated using data for former
Czechoslovakia. The details on how the data were obtained can be found at http://www.tu-
darmstadt.de/∼rehme/endopol/data04-07.htm.
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Table 5: Pairwise Covariances
GA GA2 GR TAX70 RRED LN70 MSCHOOL60 LIFEEXP60
GA 0.02740
(29)
GA2 0.03940
(29)
0.05746
(29)
GR 0.00017
(29)
0.00023
(29)
0.00010
(29)
TAX70 0.00099
(23)
0.00089
(23)
−0.00006
(23)
0.00431
(23)
RRED −0.00690
(21)
−0.01018
(21)
−0.00004
(21)
0.00324
(17)
0.00922
(29)
LN70 0.00954
(27)
0.01483
(27)
−0.00260
(27)
0.00541
(23)
−0.00757
(19)
0.20396
(27)
MSCHOOL60 −0.06570
(26)
−0.09257
(26)
−0.00656
(26)
0.03824
(22)
0.02345
(18)
0.46361
(26)
3.95163
(26)
LIFEEXP60 −0.00294
(25)
0.01701
(25)
−0.02390
(25)
0.08984
(21)
0.01216
(18)
1.64658
(25)
4.83650
(25)
19.88833
(25)
Number of observations in brackets.
Table 6: Plots of Tax Rates, Redistribution and Growth Against Efficiency
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